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ABSTRACT
Both weighted and unweighted Borda manipulation prob-
lems have been proved NP-hard. However, there is no
exact combinatorial algorithm known for these problems.
In this paper, we initiate the study of exact combinatorial
algorithms for both weighted and unweighted Borda ma-
nipulation problems. More precisely, we propose O∗((m ·
2m)t+1) - time andO∗(t2m) - time1 combinatorial algorithms
for weighted and unweighted Borda manipulation problems,
respectively, where t is the number of manipulators and m
is the number of candidates. Thus, for t = 2 we solve one
of the open problems posted by Betzler et al. [IJCAI 2011].
As a byproduct of our results, we show that the unweighted
Borda manipulation problem admits an algorithm of running
time O∗(29m
2 logm), based on an integer linear programming
technique. Finally, we study the unweighted Borda manip-
ulation problem under single-peaked elections and present
polynomial-time algorithms for the problem in the case of
two manipulators, in contrast to the NP-hardness of this
case in general settings.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
F.2 [Theory of Computation]: Analysis of Algorithms
and Problem Complexity; G.2.1 [Combinatorics]: Combi-
natorial algorithms; J.4 [Computer Applications]: Social
Choice and Behavioral Sciences
General Terms
Algorithms
Keywords
voting systems, Borda manipulation, exact combinatorial al-
gorithm, single-peaked election
∗Supported by the DFG Cluster of Excellence (MMCI) and
the China Scholarship Council (CSC).
†Supported by the DFG Cluster of Excellence (MMCI).
1O∗() is the O() notation with suppressed factors polyno-
mial in the size of the input.
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12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and
Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2013), Ito, Jonker, Gini, and
Shehory (eds), May, 6-10, 2013, Saint Paul, Minnnesota,
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1. INTRODUCTION
Voting systems have many applications in a variety of ar-
eas, including political election, web spam reduction, multi-
agent planning, etc. The Borda system, proposed by Jean-
Charles de Borda in 1781 [7], is one of the most significant
voting systems. It is the prototype of scoring systems and
many other voting systems. The Borda system has been
used for selecting presidential election candidates in some of
the Pacific island countries such as Nauru and Kiribati. It
also has been shown that the Borda system is a powerful
technique for pattern recognition.
Certain issues which have been attracting much attention
in voting systems are the strategic behaviors, e.g., one or
more than one voter to influence the outcome of the elec-
tions by doing some tricks. By the celebrated Gibbard-
Satterthwaite Theorem [14, 19], every reasonable voting sys-
tem with at least three candidates can be attacked by the
voters with providing insincere votes. However, from the
viewpoint of complexity theory, if it is NP-hard to deter-
mine how to influence the election, one may give up his at-
tacking to the election. From this point, computational com-
plexity could be a reasonable way to protect elections from
being attacked. The first study in this direction was con-
ducted by Bartholdi et al. in their seminal paper [16]. Since
then, researches on computational complexity of strategic
behaviors of voting systems have been opened up (See [15,
20, 9, 6, 2] for more details). Recently, many NP-hard
strategic behavior problems have been extensively studied
from the view point of exact, exponential-time algorithms,
for instance, manipulations [5], bribery problems [8], con-
trol problems [12], etc. For more recent development in
this direction, we refer to the excellent survey by Betzler et
al. [1]. We focus on deriving exact combinatorial algorithms
for weighted and unweighted Borda manipulation problems,
both of which have been proved NP-hard [2, 6].
1.1 Preliminaries
A multiset S := {s1, s2, ..., s|S|} is a generalization of a set
where objects of S are allowed to appear more than one time
in S, that is, si = sj is allowed for i 6= j. An element of S is
one copy of some object. We use s ∈+ S to denote that s is
an element of S. The cardinality of S denoted by |S| is the
number of elements contained in S. For example, the cardi-
nality of the multiset {1, 1, 1, 2, 3, 3} is 6. For two multisets
A and B, we use AunionmultiB to denote the multiset containing all
elements in A and B. For example, for A := {1, 1, 2, 3, 3, 4}
and B := {1, 2, 3}, A unionmultiB := {1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 4}.
Normally, a voting system can be specified by a set C
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of candidates, a multiset ΠV := {piv1 , piv2 , ..., pivn} of votes
casted by a corresponding set V := {v1, v2, . . . , vn} of vot-
ers (pivi is casted by vi), and a voting protocol which maps
the election (C,ΠV ,V) to a candidate w ∈ C which we call
the winner . Each vote piv ∈+ ΠV is defined by a bijection
piv : C → [|C|] (in some other literature, a vote is defined as
a linear order over the candidates), where [n] denotes the
set {1, 2, ..., n}. The position of a candidate c in piv is the
value of piv(c). We say a voter v placing a candidate c in
his/her x-th position or a voter v fixing his/her x-th posi-
tion by the candidate c if piv(c) = x. The candidate placed
in the highest, that is, the |C|-th, position in piv is called
the most preferred candidate of v, the candidate placed in
the second-highest, that is, the (|C|− 1)-th, position in piv is
called the second preferred candidate of v, and so on.
In the following, we use m to denote the number of can-
didates. A Borda protocol can be defined by a vector 〈m−
1,m−2, ..., 0〉. Each voter contributes m−1 score to his/her
most preferred candidate, m−2 score to his/her second pre-
ferred candidates, and so on. The winner is a candidate
who has the highest total score. Here, we break a tie ran-
domly, that is, if there is more than one candidate having
the highest score, the winner will be chosen randomly from
these candidates. In a weighted Borda system, each voter
v is associated with a non-negative integer weight f(v) and
contributes f(v)·(m−1) score to his/her most preferred can-
didate, f(v) ·(m−2) score to his/her second preferred candi-
date, and so on. Accordingly, a candidate having the highest
total score wins the election. The unweighted Borda system
is the special case of the weighted Borda system where each
voter has the unit weight of 1.
For a candidate c and a voter v, we use SCv(c) to denote
the score of c which is contributed by v, that is, SCv(c) :=
f(v) ·(piv(c)−1) (in an unweighted Borda system, SCv(c) :=
piv(c)−1). Let SCV(c) denote the total score of c contributed
by voters in V, that is, SCV(c) :=∑v∈V SCv(c).
In the settings of manipulation, we have, in addition to
V, a set V ′ of voters which are called manipulators. The
manipulators form a coalition and desire to coordinate their
votes to make a distinguished candidate win the new election
with votes in ΠV unionmulti ΠV′ , where ΠV′ is the multiset of votes
casted by the manipulators. The formal definitions of the
problems studied in this paper are as follows.
Unweighted Borda Manipulation (UBM)
Input: An election (C ∪ {p},ΠV ,V) where p is not the win-
ner, and a set V ′ of t manipulators.
Question: Can the manipulators cast their votes ΠV′ in such
a way that p wins the election (C ∪ {p},ΠV unionmultiΠV′ ,V ∪ V ′)?
Weighted Borda Manipulation (WBM)
Input: A weighted election (C ∪ {p},ΠV ,V, f1 : V → N)
where p is not the winner, a set V ′ of t manipulators and a
weight function f2 : V ′ → N.
Question: Can the manipulators cast their votes ΠV′ in such
a way that p wins the weighted election (C∪{p},ΠVunionmultiΠ′V′ ,V∪
V ′, f : V ∪ V ′ → N), where f(v) = f1(v) if v ∈ V and
f(v) = f2(v) otherwise?
Since we break ties randomly, in order to make p the win-
ner, the manipulators must assure that after the manipula-
tion the distinguished candidate p becomes the only candi-
date who has the highest total score among all candidates.
1.2 Related Work and Our Contribution
As one of the most prominent voting systems, complex-
ity of strategic behaviors under the Borda systems has been
intensively studied. It is known that many types of bribery
and control behaviors under the unweighted Borda system
are NP-hard. For manipulation behaviors, WBM is NP-
hard even when the election contains only three candidates [5].
Bartholdi et al. [16] showed that both UBM and WBM in the
case of only one manipulator are polynomial-time solvable.
The complexity of UBM in the case of more than one manip-
ulator remained open for many years, until very recently it
was provedNP-hard even when restricted to the case of only
two manipulators [2, 6]. Heuristic and approximation algo-
rithms for UBM have been studied in the literature [23, 6]. It
is worthy to mention that Zuckerman et al. [23] showed that
UBM admits an approximation algorithm which can out-
put a success manipulation with t + 1 manipulators when-
ever the given instance has a success manipulation with t
manipulators. By applying the integer linear programming
(ILP) techinique, UBM can be solved exactly with a very
high computational complexity O∗(m!O(m!)) [2]. However,
no purely combinatorial exact algorithm seems known for
these problems. In particular, Betzler et al. [2] posed as
an open problem whether UBM can be solved exactly with
a running time single-exponentially depending on m in the
case of constant number of manipulators.
We propose two algorithms solving WBM and UBM in
O∗((m·2m)t+1) time and O∗(t2m) time, respectively, where t
is the number of manipulators and m is the number of candi-
dates. Both algorithms are based on dynamic programming
techniques. Our results imply that both WBM and UBM
can be solved in time single exponentially on m in the case of
constant number of manipulators, answering the open ques-
tion in [2]. Additionally, we improve the running time of the
ILP-based algorithms for UBM to O∗(29m
2 logm). The key
here is to transfer UBM to an integer linear programming
with m2 variables. Furthermore, we study polynomial-time
algorithms for UBM in the case of at most two manipulators
under single-peaked elections (the definition of single-peaked
election is introduced in Sec. 4). Due to lack of space, some
proofs are deferred to the long version.
2. ALGORITHMFORWEIGHTEDBORDA
MANIPULATION
In this section, we present an exact combinatorial algo-
rithm for WBM. The following observation is clearly true.
Observation 1. Every true-instance of WBM has a so-
lution where each manipulator places the distinguished can-
didate p in his/her highest position.
Let ((C ∪ {p},ΠV ,V, f1),V ′, f2, t) be the given instance.
Due to Observation 1, there must be a solution ΠV′ with
SCV∪V′(p) := SCV(p) +
∑
v′∈V′ f(v
′) · |C| if this instance
is true. Therefore, to make p the winner, SCV′(c) ≤ g(c)
should be satisfied for all c ∈ C, where g(c) := SCV(p) +∑
v′∈V′ f(v
′) · |C| − SCV(c) − 1. The value of g(c) is called
the capacity of c. Meanwhile, if in the given instance there is
a candidate c with g(c) < 0, then the given instance must be
a false-instance. Therefore, in the following, we assume that
the given instance contains no candidate c with g(c) < 0.
Based on these, we can reformulate WBM as follows:
2
Reformulation of WBM
Input: A set C of candidates associated with a capacity func-
tion g : C → N, and a multiset F := {f1, f2, ..., ft} of non-
negative integers.
Question: Is there a multiset Π := {pi1, pi2, ..., pit} of bijec-
tions mapping from C to [|C|] such that∑ti=1 fi · (pii(c)− 1) ≤ g(c)
holds for all c ∈ C?
Here, the bijection pii corresponds to the vote casted by
the i-th manipulator and fi ∈+ F corresponds to the weight
of the i-th manipulator (suppose that a fixed ordering over
the manipulators is given).
Our algorithm is based on a dynamic programming method
which is associated with a boolean dynamic table defined as
DT (C,Z1, Z2, ..., Zt), where C ⊆ C is a subset of candi-
dates, Zi ⊆ [|C|] and |C| = |Zi| for all i ∈ [t]. Here, each Zi
encodes the positions that are occupied by the candidates
of C in the vote casted by the i-th manipulator. The en-
try DT (C,Z1, Z2, ..., Zt) = 1 means that there is a multiset
Π = {pi1, pi2, ..., pit} of bijections mapping from C to [|C|]
such that for each i ∈ [t], ⋃c∈C{pii(c)} = Zi and, for every
candidate c ∈ C, c is “safe” under Π. Here, we say a can-
didate c is safe under Π, if
∑t
i=1 fi · (pii(c)− 1) ≤ g(c). In-
tuitively, DT (C,Z1, Z2, ..., Zt) = 1 means that we can place
all candidates of C in the positions encoded by Zi for all
i ∈ [t] without exceeding the capacity of any c ∈ C. Clearly,
a given instance of WBM is a true-instance if and only if
DT (C, Z1 := [|C|], Z2 := [|C|], ..., Zt := [|C|]) = 1. The algo-
rithm is as follows:
Initialization: For all c ∈ C and z1, z2, ..., zt ∈ [|C|], if∑t
i=1 fi · (zi − 1) ≤ g(c), thenDT ({c}, {z1}, {z2}, ..., {zt}) =
1; otherwise, DT ({c}, {z1}, {z2}, ..., {zt}) = 0.
Updating: For each l from 2 to |C|, we update the entries
DT (C,Z1, Z2, ..., Zt) with |C| = |Z1| = |Z2| = ... = |Zt| = l
as follows: if ∃c ∈ C and ∃zi ∈ Zi for all i ∈ [t] such
that DT (C \ {c}, Z1 \ {z1}, Z2 \ {z2}, ..., Zt \ {zt}) = 1 and
DT ({c}, {z1}, {z2}, ..., {zt}) = 1, thenDT (C,Z1, Z2, ..., Zt) =
1, otherwise, DT (C,Z1, Z2, ..., Zt) = 0.
Theorem 2. WBM is solvable in O∗((|C| ·2|C|)t+1) time.
Proof. We consider the above algorithm for WBM. In
the initialization, we check whether
∑t
i=1 fi · (zi − 1) ≤ g(c)
for each candidate c ∈ C and each encoded position zi ∈ [|C|]
for each i ∈ [t]. Since there are |C| many candidates and |C|
many positions to be considered for each zi, the running
time of the initialization is bounded by O∗(|C|t+1). In the
recurrence, we compute DT (C,Z1, Z2, ..., Zt) for all C ⊆ C
and all Z1 ⊆ [|C|], Z2 ⊆ [|C|], ..., Zt ⊆ [|C|] with |C| = |Z1| =
|Z2| = ... = |Zt| = l, where 2 ≤ l ≤ m. To compute
each of them, we consider all possibilities of c ∈ C and
z1 ∈ Z1, z2 ∈ Z2, ..., zt ∈ Zt. For each possibility, we fur-
ther check whether DT (C \ {c}, Z1 \ {z1}, Z2 \ {z2}, ..., Zt \
{zt}) = 1 and DT ({c}, {z1}, {z2}, ..., {zt}) = 1. Since there
are at most |C|t+1 such possibilities, and there are at most
2(t+1)|C| entries needed to be computed, we arrive at the
total running time of O∗((|C| · 2|C|)t+1).
The correctness directly follows from the meaning of the
dynamic table we defined.
In [2], Betzler et al. posed as an open question whether
UBM in case of two manipulators can be solved in less than
O∗(|C|!) time. By Theorem 2, we can answer this question
affirmatively.
Corollary 3. WBM (UBM is a special case of WBM)
in case of two manipulators can be solved in O∗(8|C|) time.
3. ALGORITHMFORUNWEIGHTEDBORDA
MANIPULATION
In this section, we study the UBM problem. Recall that
UBM is a special case of WBM where all voters have the
same unit weight. However, compared to the weighted ver-
sion, when we compute SCV′(c) for a candidate c, it is ir-
relevant which manipulators placed c in the j-th positions.
The decisive factor is the number of manipulators placing c
in the j-th positions. This leads to the following approach
where we firstly reduce UBM to a matrix problem and then
solve this matrix problem by a dynamic programming tech-
nique, resulting in a better running time than in Corollary
3. Firstly, the matrix problem is defined as follows.
Filling Magic Matrix (FMM)
Input: A multiset g := {g1 , g2 , ..., gm} of non-negative inte-
gers and an integer t > 0.
Question: Is there an m ×m matrix M with non-negative
integers such that ∀i ∈ [m], ∑mj=1 (j − 1) ·M [i][j] ≤ gi and∑m
j=1M [i][j] = t, and ∀j ∈ [m],
∑m
i=1M [i][j] = t?
In the following, we present an algorithm for FMM. The
algorithm is based on a dynamic programming method asso-
ciated with a boolean dynamic table DT (l, T ), where l ∈ [m]
and T := {Tj ∈ N | j ∈ [m], Tj ≤ t} is a multiset. The entry
DT (l, T ) = 1 means that there is an m×m matrix M such
that: (1)
∑m
j=1M [i][j] = t for all i ∈ [l]; (2)
∑l
i=1M [i][j] =
Tj for all j ∈ [m]; and (3) ∑mj=1(j − 1) ·M [i][j] ≤ gi for all
i ∈ [l]. It is clear that a given instance of FMM is a true-
instance if and only if DT (m,T[m]) = 1, where T[m] is the
multiset containing m copies of t. The algorithm for solving
FMM is as follows.
Initialization: For each possible multisets T := {Tj ∈ N |
j ∈ [m], Tj ≤ t}, if ∑mj=1 Tj = t and ∑mj=1 (j − 1) · Tj ≤ g1 ,
then set DT (1, T ) = 1; otherwise, set DT (1, T ) = 0.
Updating: For each l from 2 to t and each possible multiset
T := {Tj ∈ N | j ∈ [m], Tj ≤ t}, if there is a multiset T ′ :=
{T ′j ∈ N | j ∈ [m], T ′j ≤ Tj} such that DT (l − 1, T ′) = 1,∑m
j=1 (Tj − T ′j) = t and
∑m
j=1 (j − 1) · (Tj − T ′j) ≤ gl , then
set DT (l, T ) = 1; otherwise, set DT (l, T ) = 0.
Lemma 4. FMM is solvable in O∗(t2m) time.
Proof. In the initialization, we consider all possible mul-
tisets T := {Tj ∈ N | j ∈ [m], Tj ≤ t} with ∑mj=1 Tj = t and∑m
j=1 (j − 1) · Tj ≤ g1 . Since T has at most tm possibil-
ities, the running time of the initialization is bounded by
O∗(tm). In the recurrence, we use a loop indicated by a
variable l with 2 ≤ l ≤ m to update DT (l, T ). In each
loop we compute the values of the entries DT (l, T ) for all
multisets T := {Tj ∈ N | j ∈ [m], Tj ≤ t}. To compute
each of the entries, we check whether DT (l − 1, T ′) = 1,∑m
j=1 (Tj − T ′j) = t and
∑m
j=1 (j − 1) · (Tj − T ′j) ≤ gl for all
possible multisets T ′ := {T ′j ∈ N | j ∈ [m], T ′j ≤ Tj}. Since
there are at most tm possible multisets T ′, the time to com-
pute each DT (l, T ) is bounded by O∗(tm). Since T has at
most tm possibilities, there are at most tm entries needed to
be computed in each loop, implying a total time of O∗(t2m)
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for recurrence procedure. In conclusion, the total time of
the algorithm is O∗(t2m).
The correctness directly follows from the meaning we de-
fined for the dynamic table.
We now come to show how to solve UBM via FMM. A
partial vote is a partial injection pi : C ∪ {p} → [|C ∪ {p}|]
which maps a subset C ⊆ C ∪ {p} onto [|C ∪ {p}|] such that
for any two distinct a1, a2 ∈ C, pi(a1) 6= pi(a2). Here, C is
the domain and {pi(a) | a ∈ C} is the codomain of pi. A
position not in the codomain is called a free position. For
simplicity, we define pi(c) = −1 for c 6∈ C.
Lemma 5. UBM can be reduced to FMM in polynomial
time.
Proof Sketch. Let Γ := ((C ∪ {p},ΠV ,V),V ′, t) be an
instance of UBM. By Observation 1, we know that if Γ is a
true-instance there must be a solution ΠV′ such that each
manipulator places p in his/her highest position. We assume
that SCV(p)+t·|C|−SCV(c)−1 ≥ 0 for all c ∈ C as discussed
in Section 2. Let (c1, c2, ..., c|C|) be any arbitrary ordering
of C. We construct an instance Γ′ := (t, g) of FMM where
t has the same value as in Γ and g := {g1, g2, ..., g|C|} with
gi = SCV(p) + t · |C| − SCV(ci) − 1 for all i ∈ [|C|]. It is
clear that the construction takes polynomial time. In the
following, we prove that Γ is a true-instance if and only if
Γ′ is a true-instance.
⇒: Given a solution ΠV′ for Γ, we can get a solution for
Γ′ by setting M [i][j] = |{pi ∈+ ΠV′ | pi(ci) = j}|, where
{pi ∈+ ΠV′ | pi(ci) = j} is the multiset containing all votes
pi ∈+ ΠV′ with pi(ci) = j. By the above construction, the
correctness of M is easy to verify.
⇐: Let a |C|×|C| matrix M be a solution for Γ′ := (t, g :=
{g1, g2, ..., g|C|}). Then, a solution for Γ, where there are
exactly M [i][j] manipulators who place ci in the j-th posi-
tions, can be constructed by the following polynomial algo-
rithm. For simplicity, for a candidate ci and an integer j
with 1 ≤ j ≤ |C|, ci  j means that there are less than
M [i][j] manipulators who have already placed ci in the j-th
position. For two partial votes pi and pi′ and two candidates
c and c′, (pi, c)↔ (pi′, c′) means to switch the position of c in
pi and the position of c′ in pi′, that is, if pi(c) = j, pi′(c′) = j′
then, after (pi, c)↔ (pi′, c′), pi(c′) = j, pi′(c) = j′.
Algorithm for constructing a solution for Γ from Γ′
Step 1 Initialize ΠV′ := {pi1, pi2, ..., pit} of partial votes such
that each partial vote has empty domain;
Step 2 Set piz(p) = |C|+ 1 for all z ∈ [t];
Step 3 For j¯ = |C| to 1, do
Step 3.1 While ∃piz where the j¯-th position is free, do
Step 3.1.1 Let ci be any candidate with ci  j¯;
Step 3.1.2 If piz(ci) = −1, then set piz(ci) = j¯;
Step 3.1.3 Else, let j′ = piz(ci) and let piz′ be a vote with
piz′(ci) = −1;
Step 3.1.3.1 If the j¯-th position of piz′ is free, then set
piz′(ci) = j¯
Step 3.1.3.2 Else
Step 3.1.3.2.1 While ∃j′′ > j¯ with pi−1z (j′′) = pi−1z′ (j′), do
Step 3.1.3.2.1.1 (piz, pi
−1
z (j
′))↔ (piz′ , pi−1z′ (j′));
Step 3.1.3.2.1.2 Let j′ = j′′;
Step End While 3.1.3.2.1
c5 c1 c7 ci c4
j¯j′j′′
c2 c7 c3 c1 c4 c5
piz
piz′
c5 c7 c3 c1 c4 ci
j¯
c2 c1 c7 ci c4 c5
piz
piz′
Figure 1: The left-hand shows the statues of piz and
piz′ before performing the switches. Due to the al-
gorithm, switchings will happen between the candi-
dates linked by dark lines. The gray lines here are
to show that pi−1z (j
′′) = pi−1z′ (j
′), as in the precondition
of the while loop in Step 3.1.3.2.1. The right-hand
shows the status after these switches.
Step 3.1.3.2.2 (piz, pi
−1
z (j
′))↔ (piz′ , pi−1z′ (j′));
Step 3.1.3.2.3 Set piz(ci) = j¯;
Step End Else 3.1.3.2
Step End Else 3.1.3
Step End While 3.1
Step End For 3
Step 4 Return ΠV′ .
Since
∑|C|
i=1M [i][j¯] = t and there are exactly t manip-
ulators, there must be a candidate ci with ci  j¯ when-
ever there is a vote whose j¯-th position is free, which guar-
antees the soundness of Step 3.1.1. Similarly, there must
be a piz′ with piz′(ci) = −1 in Step 3.1.3, since, otherwise,∑|C|
j=1M [i][j] > t, contradicting that the given instance of
FMM is a true-instance. After the switches in the while
loop in Step 3.1.3.2.1 and Step 3.1.3.2.2, both piz and piz′
must fulfill the injection properties of partial votes. See Fig.
1 for an example of the switches of the while loop in Step
3.1.3.2.1.
Obviously, such a constructed ΠV′ corresponds to a so-
lution for UBM: for each candidate ci ∈ C, SCV′(ci) =∑|C|
j=1 (j − 1) ·M [i][j] ≤ gi = SCV(p) + t · |C| −SCV(ci)− 1.
To analysis the running time of the algorithm, we need
the following lemma.
Lemma 6. Each execution of the “while” loop in Step 3.1.3.2.1
takes polynomial time.
Proof. To prove the lemma, we construct an auxiliary
bipartite graph B with Cz′ as the left-hand vertices and Cz
as the right-hand vertices, where Cz′ and Cz are the sets of
candidates which have been placed by piz′ and piz in some
j¯>-th position (a j>-th position is a position higher than
the j-th position), respectively. Two vertices are adjacent if
and only if they represent the same candidate (as the vertices
linked by a gray line in Figure 1) or they were placed in the
same (but not identity) positions (as the vertices linked by
a black line in Figure 1). We observe that the constructed
auxiliary graph has maximum degree two. Since Cz′ \ Cz is
not empty, there is a simple path P := (ca1 , ca2 , ..., cax) with
ca1 = ci and cax ∈ Cz′ \ Cz. It is clear that each execution
of the “while” loop corresponds to the following switching
processing: switching the positions of ak and ak+1 for all
k = 1, 3, ..., x − 1 (since ca1 = ci ∈ Cz and cax ∈ Cz′ , x is
even). The lemma follows from the truth that the length of
the simple path is bounded by 2|C|.
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We now analysis the running time. The algorithm has
three loops. The “for” loop in Step 3 has |C| rounds. The
“while” loop in Step 3.1 has at most t rounds since each
execution of the loop fixes a free position for some piz. Due to
Lemma 6, the“while” loop in Step 3.1.3.2.1 takes polynomial
time. Summery all above, the running time of the algorithm
is polynomially in t and |C|, which complete the proof.
Due to Lemmas 4 and 5, we get the following theorem.
Theorem 7. UBM can be solved in O∗(t2|C|) time.
Next we show that FMM can be solved by an integer linear
programming (ILP) based algorithm. The ILP contains m2
variables xij for i, j ∈ [m] and, subject to the following
restrictions

m∑
i=1
xij = t for all j ∈ [m]
m∑
j=1
xij = t for all i ∈ [m]
m∑
j=1
(j − 1) · xij ≤ gi for all i ∈ [m]
xij ≥ 0 for all i, j ∈ [m]
where t ∈ N and g := {g1 , g2 , . . . , gm} with gi ∈ N for all
i ∈ [m] are input.
H. W. Lenstra [18] proposed an O∗(ζO(ζ))-time algorithm
for solving ILP with ζ variables. The running time was then
improved by R. Kannan [17].
Lemma 8. [17] An ILP problem with ζ variables can be
solved in O∗(ζ4.5ζ) time.
Due to Lemmas 5 and 8, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 9. UBM admits an algorithm with running time
O∗(29|C|
2 log |C|).
4. BORDAMANIPULATIONUNDER SINGLE-
PEAKED ELECTIONS
The single-peaked election was introduced by D. Black
in 1948 [3]. The complexity of many voting problems under
single-peaked elections has been studied in the literature [11,
4, 13]. It turns out that many NP-hard problems become
polynomial-time solvable when restricted to single-peaked
elections [4, 13].
Given a set C of candidates and a bijection L : C → [|C|],
we say that a vote piv : C → [|C|] is coincident with L if
and only if for any three distinct candidates a, b, c ∈ C with
L(a) < L(b) < L(c) or L(c) < L(b) < L(a), piv(c) > piv(b)
implies piv(b) > piv(a). The candidate having the highest
value of piv(·) is called the peak of piv with respect to L. An
election (C,ΠV ,V) is a single-peaked election if there exists
a bijection L : C → [|C|] such that all votes of ΠV are co-
incident with L. We call such a bijection L a harmonious
order of (C,ΠV ,V). See Fig. 2 for a concrete example of
single-peaked elections.
It has been shown in [10] that one can test whether a
given election is a single-peaked election in polynomial time.
Moreover, a harmonious order can be found in polynomial
time if the given election is a single-peaked election.
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Figure 2: This figure shows a visual representa-
tion of a single-peaked election which contains
five candidates A,B,C,D,E and three votes piv1
(defined by piv1(B) = 5, piv1(D) = 4, piv1(E) = 3,
piv1(C) = 2, and piv1(A) = 1), piv2 (which is defined
by piv2(D) = 5, piv2(B) = 4, piv2(C) = 3, piv2(A) = 2,
and piv2(E) = 1), and piv3 (which is defined by
piv3(A) = 5, piv3(C) = 4, piv3(B) = 3, piv3(D) = 2,
and piv3(E) = 1). The harmonious order L is
L(A) = 1,L(C) = 2,L(B) = 3,L(D) = 4,L(E) = 5.
Here, piv1 is illustrated by the dark line, piv2 is
illustrated by the gray line and piv3 is illustrated by
the dotted line.
For a manipulation problem under single-peaked elections,
we are given a single-peaked election (C∪{p},ΠV ,V), a har-
monious order L, and a set V ′ of manipulators. We are
asked whether the manipulators can cast their votes ΠV′ in
such a way that all their votes are coincident with L and
p wins the election (C ∪ {p},ΠV unionmulti ΠV′ ,V ∪ V ′) [22]. In the
following, let UBM1SP and UBM2SP denote the problems
of UBM with only one manipulator and with exactly two
manipulators under single peaked elections, respectively.
It is known that the unweighted Borda manipulation prob-
lem is polynomial-time solvable with one manipulator [16]
but becomes NP-hard with two manipulators [2, 6]. Here,
we show that this problem with two manipulators can be
solved in polynomial time in single-peaked elections.
Theorem 10. Both UBM1SP and UBM2SP are polynomial-
time solvable.
All remaining parts of this section are devoted to prove
Theorem 10. To this end, let (C ∪ {p},ΠV ,V) be the given
single-peaked election and L be a harmonious order of (C ∪
{p},ΠV ,V). Let (la, la−1, ..., l1, p, r1, r2, ..., rb) be an order-
ing of C ∪ {p} with L(la) < L(la−1), ..., < L(l1) < L(p) <
L(r1) < L(r2), ..., < L(rb), and let CL := {la, la−1, ..., l1}
and CR := {r1, r2, ..., rb}.
For two partial votes pi1 with domain C1 and pi2 with
domain C2, we say pi1 and pi2 are comparable if for every c ∈
C1 ∩ C2, pi1(c) = pi2(c). Furthermore, for such comparable
partial votes pi1 and pi2, let pi1 unionsq pi2 denote the partial vote
pi with domain C1 ∪C2 such that pi(c) = pi1(c) for all c ∈ C1
and pi(c) = pi2(c) for all c ∈ C2.
For a partial vote pi with domain C and a vote pi′, we say
pi is extendable to pi′ if for any a ∈ C, pi(a) = pi′(a).
The definition of single-peaked elections directly implies
the following observation.
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Figure 3: Case 2 in the proof of Lemma 12.
The left-hand shows the original vote piv with
piv(l2) > piv(l1) > piv(l3) > piv(p) > piv(r1) > piv(l4)
> piv(l5) > piv(r2) > piv(r3) > piv(l6). The right-
hand shows the recasted vote pi′ unionsq pi′′ with
piv(p) > piv(l1) > piv(l2) > piv(l3) > piv(r1) > piv(l4)
> piv(l5) > piv(r2) > piv(r3) > piv(l6). Here
Csmall = {l4, l5, l6, r1, r2, r3}, pi′ has domain
{p, l1, l2, l3} and codomain {10, 9, 8, 7}, and pi′′
has domain {r1, l4, l5, r2, r3, l6} and codomain
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}.
Observation 11. Let L be a harmonious order, piv be a
vote which is coincident with L and c be the peak of piv, then
for any c1, c2 with L(c1) < L(c2) < L(c) or L(c) < L(c2) <
L(c1), piv(c1) < piv(c2) < piv(c).
Lemma 12. Every true-instance of UBM under single-
peaked elections has a solution where every manipulator places
the distinguished candidate p in his/her highest position.
Proof. Assume that ΠV′ is a solution that contradicts
the claim of the lemma, and v is a manipulator who did
not place p in his/her highest position. Without loss of
generality, assume that CR 6= ∅, CL 6= ∅ and v placed some
li in his/her highest position. Let a := |CL| and b := |CR|.
Due to Observation 11, piv(p) > piv(r1) > piv(r2) >, ..., >
piv(rb). We consider two cases. The first case is that for any
l ∈ CL, piv(l) > piv(p). In this case, we can create a new
solution by recasting piv with piv(p) > piv(l1) > piv(l2) >
, ..., > piv(la) > piv(r1) > piv(r2) >, ..., > piv(rb). The second
case is that there is a l ∈ CL with piv(l) < piv(p). In this
case, there must be a z ∈ [a] such that piv(lj) > piv(p) for
all j ∈ [z − 1] and piv(lj) < piv(p) for all a ≥ j ≥ z. Let
Csmall := CR ∪ {lz, lz+1, ..., la}. We can get a new solution
by recasting piv with pi
′unionsqpi′′, where pi′ is the partial vote with
domain (C∪{p})\Csmall and codomain {|C∪{p}|, |C∪{p}|−
1, ..., |Csmall|+ 1} such that pi′(p) > pi′(l1) > pi′(l2) >, ..., >
pi′(lz−1), and pi′′ is the partial vote which has domain Csmall
and is extendable to the original vote piv. Fig. 3 illustrates
such a case.
For a subset C of candidates and a bijection L : C∪{p} →
[|C∪{p}|], we say that the candidates in C lie consecutively in
L if and only if there are no c1, c2 ∈ C and c ∈ (C ∪ {p}) \C
such that L(c1) < L(c) < L(c2). If C contains only two
candidates c1 and c2, then we say c1 and c2 lie consecutively
in L if |L(c1)− L(c2)| = 1.
The following lemma has been proven in [21] [Theorem 1].
Lemma 13. For two bijections L : C ∪ {p} → [|C ∪ {p}|]
and pi : C ∪ {p} → [|C ∪ {p}|], pi is coincident with L if and
only if for any integer j with 1 ≤ j ≤ |C|, all candidates in
the set {c ∈ C ∪ {p} | pi(c) ≥ j} lie consecutively in L.
The following observation directly follows from the above
lemma.
Observation 14. Let pi be a vote with p as the peak. L
is the harmonious order of the given election and CL, CR are
defined as above. Then, pi is coincident with L if and only
if for all li, li′ ∈ CL (resp. rj , rj′ ∈ CR), i < i′ (resp. j < j′)
implies pi(li) > pi(li′) (resp. pi(rj) > pi(rj′)).
4.1 Algorithm for UBM1SP
For two distinct candidates c, c′ ∈ C ∪ {p}, we say c and
c′ are neighbors if |L(c) − L(c′)| = 1. Let N(c) denote
the set of neighbors of c. Clearly, every candidate has at
most two neighbors. A block is a subset of candidates lying
consecutively in L. For a block S ⊆ C ∪ {p}, let N(S) :=
{c ∈ (C ∪ {p}) \ S | ∃c′ ∈ S with c ∈ N(c′)}. It is easy to
verify that |N(S)| ≤ 2 for every block S.
Note that the polynomial-time algorithm for the general
Borda manipulation problem with one manipulator proposed
in [16] cannot be directly used for solving UBM1SP, since
UBM1SP requires that the manipulator’s vote should be
single-peaked. Our polynomial-time algorithm for UBM1SP
is a slightly modified version of the algorithm in [16]. Ba-
sically, the algorithm places candidates one-by-one in the
positions of the manipulator’s vote, from the highest to the
lowest. The currently highest, unoccupied position of the
vote is called the “next free position”. The details of the
algorithm is as follows: (1) Place p in the highest position;
(2) Set S = {p}, where the block S is used to store all can-
didates which have been placed in some positions by the
manipulator; (3) If none of N(S) can be “safely” placed in
the next free position, then return “No”. A candidate c can
be safely placed in the j-th position of the manipulator if
SCV(c)+j−1 < SCV(p)+ |C|. The final score of p is clearly
SCV(p) + |C|. (4) Otherwise, place a candidate c ∈ N(S),
which can be safely placed in the next free position, in the
next free position and set S := S ∪ {c}. If S = C ∪ {p},
return “Yes”, otherwise, go back to step (3).
Clearly, the above algorithm needs O(m) time, where m is
the number of candidates: Each iteration extends the block
S by adding one new candidate to S. Since S can be ex-
tended at most |C| times and each iteration takes constant
time, the total time is bounded by O(m). The correctness
of the above algorithm is easy to verify by Lemma 12 and
Lemma 13.
4.2 Algorithm for UBM2SP
The algorithm for UBM2SP is similar to the one for UBM1SP:
Greedily fill free positions of both manipulators until no free
position remains or no candidate can be safely placed in a
next free position.
Main Idea: Let pi1 and pi2 be the votes of the two manip-
ulators v1 and v2. We use S1 and S2 to denote the sets of
candidates that are already placed in some positions of pi1
and pi2, respectively. At the beginning, S1 = S2 = {p} and
we then iteratively extend S1 and S2 by placing candidates
in pi1 and pi2. After each iteration, we will assure the invari-
ant that S1 = S2 and S1 is a block of L. In each iteration,
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define S = S1 = S2 and let l and r be the two neighbors
of S in L. In order to keep pi1 and pi2 single-peaked, there
are only two cases to consider: First, both next free posi-
tions of pi1 and pi2 are occupied by one of l and r; Second,
l is placed in the next free position of one of pi1 and pi2,
and r is placed in the next free position of the other. If
we have c ∈ {l, r} satisfying SCV(c) + 2α < SCV(p) + 2|C|,
where α is the score contributed by one of pi1 and pi2 with
placing c in its next free position, then we prefer the first
case, set S1 := S1 ∪ {c} and S2 := S2 ∪ {c}, and proceed
with the next iteration. Otherwise, we check whether the
second case is “safe”, that is, SCV(r) + α < SCV(p) + 2|C|
and SCV(l) + α < SCV(p) + 2|C|. If not, then the given
instance is a false-instance; otherwise, S1 := S1 ∪ {l} and
S2 := S2 ∪ {r}. Next, we have to restore the invariant that
S1 = S2. Observe that S1, S2, and S1 ∩ S2 all are blocks in
L. Moreover, S1 \ S2 and S2 \ S1 form two blocks and both
are neighbors to S1∩S2. We apply here another iteration to
consider the candidates in S1\S2 (or S2\S1) one-by-one. For
each of them in S1\S2 (or S2\S1), we place it in the highest
safe position in pi2 (or pi1) and fill the “gaps” that are con-
secutive free positions with candidates not in S1 ∪S2. More
details refer to Step 2.4 of the algorithm ALGO-UBM2SP.
For simplicity, we define some new notations. For a can-
didate c and an integer s with 1 ≤ s ≤ |C|, we use c→ s (or
c 6→ s) to denote that c can (or cannot) be safely placed in
the (|C| + 1 − s)-th position of some manipulator. We also
use c → {s1, s2} (or c 6→ {s1, s2}) to denote that c can (or
cannot) be safely placed in the (|C|+ 1− s1)-th position of
one manipulator and in the (|C|+ 1− s2)-th position of the
other, simultaneously. For a block Si corresponding to a ma-
nipulator vi with i = 1, 2 and a candidate c ∈ N(Si), we use
extend(Si, c) to denote the following operations: (1) place c
in the next free position of pii, that is, set pii(c) = |C|+1−|Si|;
and (2) extend Si with Si := Si ∪ {c}.
The algorithm ALGO-UBM2SP for UBM2SP:
Step 1 Both manipulators place p in their highest posi-
tions. Set S1 = S2 = {p}.
Step 2. While S1 = S2 6= C ∪ {p}, do let S = S1
Step 2.1 If ∃c ∈ N(S) with c→ {|S|, |S|}, then extend(S1, c)
and extend(S2, c);
Step 2.2 Else if |N(S)| = 1 and N(S) 6→ {|S|, |S|}, then re-
turn “No”; \∗ Comments: In the case
N(S) = {c}, c is the only candidate which can be placed
in the next free positions without destroying the single-
peakedness. Thus, if c 6→ {|S|, |S|}, return“No”∗\
Step 2.3 Else, let {c, c′} = N(S). If c → |S1| and c′ →
|S2|, then extend(S1, c) and extend(S2, c′), otherwise,
return “No”.
Step 2.4 While S1 6= S2, do
Step 2.4.1 Let c be any candidate in N(S1 ∩ S2) that has
already been placed in a position by only one manip-
ulator v ∈ {v1, v2};
Step 2.4.2 While c 6→ |Sz|, where z = 1 if v = v2 and z = 2
if v = v1, do
Step 2.4.2.1 If N(Sz) \ {c} = ∅, return “No”;
Step 2.4.2.2 Else, let c′ = N(Sz) \ {c}; if c′ → |Sz|, then
extend(Sz, c
′); otherwise, return “No”;
Step End While 2.4.2
Step 2.4.3 extend(Sz, c).
Step End While 2.4
Step End While 2
Step 3 Return “Yes”.
To show the correctness of the algorithm, we need the
following lemma. For a vote pi and two integers x ≤ x′ with
x, x′ ∈ [|C|+1], let Cpi(x, x′) := {c ∈ C∪{p} | x ≤ pi(c) ≤ x′}.
Let
C(L,−c) =:
{
CL if c ∈ CR
CR if c ∈ CL
Lemma 15. Let {pi1, pi2} be a solution for UBM2SP, and
c ∈ C be a candidate with pi1(c) = x and pi2(c) = y. If
there are two integers x′, y′ such that (1) x′ > x, y′ > y; (2)
SCV(c) + x′ + y′ − 2 < SCV(p) + 2|C|; (3) Cpi1(x+ 1, x′) ⊆
C(L,−c), Cpi2(y + 1, y′) ⊆ C(L,−c), then, the following two
votes pi′1, pi
′
2 with
pi′1(c
′) =

pi1(c
′) if pi1(c′) > x′ or pi1(c′) < x
x′ if c′ = c
j if x < pi1(c
′) = j + 1 ≤ x′
pi′2(c
′) =

pi2(c
′) if pi2(c′) > y′ or pi2(c′) < y
y′ if c′ = c
j if y < pi2(c
′) = j + 1 ≤ y′
must be another solution.
Proof. We can transfer pi1 to pi
′
1 by continually switching
the position of c and the position of the candidate c′ with
pi1(c
′) = pi1(c) + 1, until c is moved to the x′-th position.
Since c′ ∈ C(L,−c), due to Observation 14, each switching
will not change a vote which is coincident with L to a vote
which is not coincident with L. By the same way, we can
transfer pi2 to pi
′
2 such that pi
′
2 is coincident with L. Since
SCV(c) + x′ + y′ − 2 < SCV(c) + 2|C|, and each switch
does not increase the total scores of any other candidates,
{pi′1, pi′2} must be a solution.
We now come to show the correctness of the algorithm.
We say two partial votes pi1, pi2 with domain S1, S2 with
|S1| ≤ |S2|, respectively, are extendable to a solution, if
there is a solution {pi′1, pi′2} such that {pi′−11 (j), pi′−12 (j)} =
{pi−11 (j), pi−12 (j)} for all |C| + 2 − |S1| ≤ j ≤ |C| + 1 and
pi−12 (j) ∈ {pi′−11 (j), pi′−12 (j)} for all |C| + 2 − |S2| ≤ j <
|C|+ 2− |S1|.
Lemma 16. ALGO-UBM2SP solves UBM2SP correctly in
O(m) time, where m is the number of candidates.
Proof Sketch. Firstly, we consider the correctness. In
each step, the algorithm extends S1 (or S2) by adding a
candidate from N(S1) (or N(S2)) to S1 (or S2), which makes
S1 (or S2) always be a block. Due to Lemma 13, if the
algorithm returns “Yes”, the two votes pi1 and pi2 must be
coincident with L. We need the following observations.
Observation 17. If at some point S1 = S2 = S, pi1, pi2
are extendable to a solution, and a candidate c ∈ N(S) sat-
isfies c → {|S|, |S|}, then the partial votes pi′1 with pi′1(c′) =
pi1(c
′) for c′ ∈ S and pi′1(c) = |C| + 1 − |S| and pi′2 with
pi′2(c
′) = pi2(c′) for c′ ∈ S and pi′2(c) = |C| + 1 − |S| are
extendable to a solution.
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Observation 18. If at some point S1 = S2 = S with
N(S) = {l, r}, pi1, pi2 are extendable to a solution, no can-
didate c ∈ N(S) satisfies c → {|S|, |S|}, and l → |S| and
r → |S|, then, the partial votes pi′1 with pi′1(c′) = pi1(c′) for
c′ ∈ S and pi′1(l) = |C|+ 1− |S| and pi′2 with pi′2(c′) = pi2(c′)
for c′ ∈ S and pi′2(r) = |C| + 1 − |S| are extendable to a
solution.
Observation 19. If at some point two partial votes pi1
and pi2 with domains S1 and S2, respectively, are extendable
to a solution and there is a candidate c which has been placed
in some position in pii (but has not been placed by the other
vote, that is, pi3−i), where i = 1 or i = 2, then, the partial
votes pii and pi
′ with pi′(c′) = pi3−i(c
′) for c′ ∈ S3−i, and
pi′(c) = min{SCV(p) + 2|C| − SCV(c) − pii(c) + 1, |C| + 1 −
|S3−i|} are extendable to a solution.
The correctness of the above observations follows from
Lemma 15.
Due to Lemma 12, Step 1 is correct. Then, we consider the
while loop in Step 2. Due to Observation 17, if Step 2.1 was
executed and the given instance is a true-instance, then, the
partial votes after the execution of Step 2.1 must be extend-
able to a solution. Otherwise, if Step 2.1 was not executed,
and N(S) contains only one candidate, then the given in-
stance must be a false-instance as described in the comments
of Step 2.2. Finally, if the extend operations in Step 2.3 was
executed, then, due to Observation ??, these operations are
correct. If Step 2.3 returns “No”, then the given instance
must be a false-instance. The reason for this is that, due
to Lemma 13 and Observation ??, if the given instance is a
true-instance, then pi1, pi2 must be extendable to a solution
and thus, the next free positions must be occupied by N(S).
If the conditions of Steps 2.1 to 2.3 are not satisfied, the next
free positions can not be safely placed, then we can return
“No”. After the execution of extend operations in Step 2.3,
S1 6= S2, and the algorithm then goes to the while loop in
Step 2.4. Since S1∩S2 6= ∅ (at least p ∈ S1∩S2) and both S1
and S2 are blocks (this is easy to check by the definition of
extend), there must be at least one candidate c ∈ N(S1∩S2)
which has already been placed in a position by a manipu-
lator v ∈ {v1, v2}. Due to Observation ??, if the given in-
stance is a true-instance, then we can place c in the position
y = min{SCV(p) + 2|C|−SCV(c)−pii(c) + 1, |C|+ 1− |Sz|},
where i = 1, z = 2 if v = v1 and i = 2, z = 1 if v = v2, to
get partial votes which are extendable to a solution. Due to
Lemma 13, all free positions higher than the y-th position
can only fixed by candidates from C(L,−c) \ Sz, and each
of these free positions is fixed by an unique candidate from
C(L,−c)\Sz. These are exactly what the while loop in 2.4.2
does: fixing the free positions which are higher than the y-
th position one-by one. After the loop, Step 2.4.3 places c
in the y-th position. However, if |C(L,−c) \ Sz| is less than
the number of free positions which are higher than the y-th
position, then due to Lemma 13, the given instance must
be a false-instance. Due to the above analysis, each case of
Steps 2.1 to 2.4 correctly extends the partial votes to two
new partial votes which are also extendable to a solution, or
correctly returns “No”.
To analyze the running time, we need to consider how
many times Steps 2.1, 2.3, 2.4.1, 2.4.2.2, 2.4.3 are executed.
For simplicity, let nλ denote the number of times that Step
λ is executed throughout the algorithm. It is clear that
n2.4.1 = n2.4.3. Since each execution of Steps 2.1, 2.3, 2.4.2.2,
2.4.3 extends at least one of S1 and S2 by adding a new can-
didate to the block or terminates the algorithm, and both
S1 and S2 can be extended at most 2|C| times, we conclude
that n2.1+n2.3+n2.4.1+n2.4.2.2+n2.4.3 = O(|C|). Since each
execution of these Steps needs constant time2, we arrive at
a total running time of O(|C|).
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we initiate the study of exact combinato-
rial algorithms for Borda manipulation problems. We pro-
pose two exact combinatorial algorithms with running times
O∗((m · 2m)t+1) and O∗(t2m) for WBM and UBM, respec-
tively, where t is the number of manipulators and m is the
number of candidates in the given election. These results
answer an open problem posed by Betzler et al. [2]. In
addition, we present an integer linear programming based
algorithm with running time O∗(29m
2 logm) for UBM. Fi-
nally, we study UBM under single-peaked elections and pro-
pose polynomial-time algorithms for UBM in case of no more
than two manipulators. We mention here that all our algo-
rithms can be used with slight modifications for (positional)
scoring systems.
One future direction could be to improve the presented
combinatorial algorithms. Parameterized complexity has
been proved a powerful tool to handle NP-hard problems.
As showed here and in [2], UBM is fixed-parameter tractable
with respect to the number m of candidates. A challenging
work is to improve the running time to O∗(2m logm), or even
O∗(cm) with c being a constant. Furthermore, the complex-
ity of UBM in the case of more than two manipulators under
single-peaked elections remains open.
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